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 Glossary 
 Adverse selection: A "hidden information" problem that arises when one side of a 
transaction has inadequate information about the other side, leading to a process of selection that is 
adverse to the party that is inadequately informed.  When applied to product markets, this is 
sometimes described as a "lemons" problem. 
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 Asymmetric information: The condition where one side of a transaction or market knows 
something (often about itself) that the other side does not know.  The two primary categories of 
asymmetric information are "hidden information" (which yields the problem of "adverse selection" 
or "lemons") and "hidden action" (which yields the problem of ("moral hazard", "agency", or 
"agent-principal"). 
 
 Credit scoring: The process whereby standardized data about large numbers of borrowers, 
including their repayment history, are collected and analyzed, so as to yield predictions (a "credit 
score") as to the likelihood of loan repayment by a borrower with certain bundle of characteristics. 
 
 Fiduciary obligation: The obligation on the part of one party to a financial transaction to 
take into account the best interests of another party. 
 
 Financial intermediary: An institution that invests primarily in financial assets (e.g., loans, 
mortgages, bonds, shares of stock) and that issues liabilities on itself (e.g., deposits) so as to provide 
the funding for those investments.  Examples include banks and other depositories, insurance 
companies, finance companies, pension funds, capital venture firms, leasing companies, mutual 
funds, and hedge funds. 
 
 Financial facilitator: A firm that facilitates financial transactions but that does not act 
primarily as a financial intermediary.  Examples include brokers, dealers, advisers, investment 
bankers, mortgage bankers, underwriters, analysts, ratings firms, and accountants. 
 
 Government sponsored enterprises (GSEs): A limited-purpose corporation that is chartered 
by the federal government but that has private shareholders.  The two most prominent GSEs are the 
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Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") and The Federal National Home Loan 
Corporation ("Freddie Mac"). 
 
 Moral hazard: A "hidden action" problem that arises because of the changed circumstances 
and incentives that are a consequence of a contract or agreement and because of the inability of one 
side of the contract or agreement adequately to monitor the other.  This is also often known as an 
"agency" or "agent-principal" problem. 
 
 Predatory lending: The process of lending excessively large amounts at excessively high 
rates to individuals for whom such loans are inappropriate (e.g., because of their inability to 
appreciate fully the consequences of their actions). 
 
 Securitization: The process of converting bundles of non-tradable loans or similar 
obligations (which are assets from the perspective of the holder) into tradable securities.  Examples 
include the "packaging" of residential mortgages, automobile loans, boat loans, commercial real 
estate mortgages, and credit-card receivables. 
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 Banks and financial institutions -- indeed the financial sector generally -- have been heavily 
influenced by "the new economy."  Some of these channels of influence have been direct and 
obvious; others have been more subtle; and there have been a few areas where banks especially 
have lagged.  Because of the financial sector's importance and centrality for any economy, as well 
as some special characteristics of the sector, the study of its relation to the new economy is 
worthwhile. 
 
 I. The Functions of the Financial Sector 
 The financial sector performs two important functions in almost any economy.  First, it 
provides the channels through which a society's savings are converted into investments.  Thus, 
financial intermediaries -- banks and other depositories, insurance companies, finance companies, 
pension funds, mutual funds, venture capital funds, leasing firms, and so-called hedge funds -- 
provide vehicles for individuals, enterprises, and governments to "park" their surplus earnings: to 
save.  These intermediaries also lend and invest those savings, thus accomplishing the 
transformation.  In addition, financial facilitators -- brokers, dealers, investment bankers, mortgage 
bankers, underwriters, advisors, analysts, ratings firms, accountants -- provide the services and 
information that facilitate financial transactions, including efforts of individuals directly to invest 
their savings and to obtain finance. 
 Second, the financial sector provides a payments system -- primarily checks and check 
clearing, although electronic payments are increasingly important -- that "greases the wheels" of the 
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real economy and encourages efficient transactions. 
 
 II. Finance is Special 
 Finance is special and worthy of special attention, for at least three reasons.  First, finance is 
ubiquitous.  Enterprises need finance in order to invest in factories, equipment, and inventories in 
anticipation of future sales and profits.  Governments need finance to cover shortfalls between 
expenditures and revenues.  And individuals need finance to permit the purchase of "big ticket" 
items (e.g., a house, a car, a wedding celebration, a vacation) that exceed the individual's short-run 
flow of income.  In essence, finance allows the spreading of the cost over time or the deferral of the 
cost until some future date (when income is expected to be higher). 
 Second, as was discussed above, finance is associated with the payments system, which 
again is ubiquitous.  In the U.S., this payments system historically has been dominated by checks 
and check clearing, but electronic payments -- such as direct deposit, automatic bill payment, and 
point-of-sale debit -- have recently become increasingly important. 
 Third, finance has an inherent and unavoidable time dimension that is not shared by most 
other transactions.1  A financial transaction -- say, a loan or an investment -- involves an initial 
transfer of funds and then the expectation that at some future date or dates the funds will be 
returned (as the repayment of a loan with interest, or the returns on an equity investment).2  This 
unavoidable time gap gives rise to potential problems of asymmetric information.  Before making a 
loan a lender3 will have difficulty discerning who is a trustworthy borrower (with a high probability 
                                                           
    1 Rental transactions are an exception and do share this feature. 
    2 Similarly, insurance involves initial payments in the expectation of a payoff if the insured-
against event occurs. 
    3 For the sake of compactness, I will describe these problems in terms of a lender and a borrower; 
but they apply equally well to other forms of finance, such as equity investments and insurance.  
Indeed, the terms "adverse selection" and "moral hazard" first came into common usage in the 
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of repaying) and who is a risky borrower (with a low probability of repaying); this raises the 
problem of "adverse selection".  After making the loan, the lender still has to worry about the 
borrower's defaulting on the loan; this is the problem of "moral hazard".  In many ways, the 
problems of asymmetric information create an informational "fog" that lenders (and low-risk 
borrowers) want to try to pierce. 
 It is worth noting that there is a link between this lending problem and the financial sector's 
centrality in the payments system:  When individual A accepts the check of individual B as 
payment in a transaction, the former is essentially acting as a short-term lender, granting a short-
term loan to the latter (until the check is cashed and cleared).  Thus, the payments system itself 
(unless only government-issued currency and coins are used) involves the same problems of 
asymmetric information. 
 As we will see, all three areas of specialness have been affected by the new economy. 
 
 III. The New Economy 
 An essential feature of the new economy has been the dramatic improvements in the 
capabilities of microprocessors and their complementary components (such as computer hard 
drives).  In turn, these have meant dramatic improvements -- lower costs and expanded capabilities 
-- for data processing and telecommunications.4 
 The prominent manifestations of these improvements have been the widespread business 
and home usage of personal computers and the rapid expansion of the Internet, used for 
communication (e-mail) and for information and transactions (webpages on the World Wide Web). 
 The manifestations in the financial sector have been more subtle -- and in some cases slow -- but 
                                                                                                                                                             
insurance industry. 
    4 Improved fiber-optic cable and lasers have also been important for telecommunications. 
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nevertheless important. 
 
 IV. Information, Finance, and the New Economy 
 Recall the problems of asymmetric information as applied to finance:  The lender wants to 
get his/her money back (with interest), but is unsure as to who is a good risk before the event and is 
still worried about repayment after the loan has been made.  As the term "asymmetric information" 
implies, at the heart of the problem is information -- or its lack.  But the new economy is all about 
"faster, better, cheaper" information, which ought to have a significant effect on finance.  And it 
does. 
 A convenient way of portraying the link between information and finance is provided in 
Figure 1.  In that figure, potential borrowers are arrayed along a one-dimensional spectrum of 
"informational transparency" (for financial purposes).  At the right are highly transparent entities 
(e.g., the U.S. Government, or the General Motors Corporation); at the left are extremely opaque 
entities (e.g., a small start-up enterprise, or a young adult). 
 Figure 1 also shows from whom these entities are likely to obtain their finance.  (a) The 
highly opaque entities at the left will have to rely on friends and family, plus self-finance.  The 
friends and family are likely to have special information (as well as extra points of leverage in 
extracting repayment) that outside lenders would not have.  (b) The highly transparent entities at the 
right will be able to access the public securities markets, where non-specialist investors (with the 
help of the financial facilitators mentioned above) will feel comfortable buying their bonds and 
equity shares.  And (c)  the entities in the middle will rely on specialist lenders -- banks and other 
financial intermediaries (except mutual funds) -- for their finance; these specialists have the 
expertise to gather and analyze information about prospective borrowers, so as to sort good risks 
from not-so-good risks, and to monitor borrowers (so as to reduce defaults) after loans have been 
made. 
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 The "squiggly" lines that separate the public securities markets from the specialist lending 
markets and that separate the latter from the "friends and family" finance are meant to convey the 
idea that the boundaries are fuzzy rather than precise. 
 Most important for our purposes, the arrows above the squiggly lines point to the left, 
indicating that the boundaries are moving to the left.  Here is where the information revolution of 
the new economy is having its greatest impact.  At the right-hand boundary, the processes of 
securitization have permitted the securities markets to "invade" areas of lending that were the near-
exclusive preserve of the specialist (financial intermediary) lenders two-to-three decades ago.  
Thus, residential mortgages, credit-card loans, automobile loans, boat loans, and commercial real 
estate loans are now regularly securitized and traded as securities rather than held as non-tradable 
assets by a specialist lender.  Underlying this securitization has been the information revolution, 
whereby large amounts of information concerning borrowers and their loans5 can be collected, 
transmitted, and analyzed more effectively and cheaply. 
 Similarly, the boundary on the left has been moving leftward as well.  Banks and other 
intermediaries are offering loans and other financial services to entities that would have been 
considered to be too opaque a few decades ago.  The growth of credit card dissemination and usage, 
low-documentation mortgages, and 100% loan-to-value mortgages are just a few of the indicators 
of this side of the information revolution. 
 Figure 2 expands on these notions by showing two important dimensions of information 
opaqueness/transparency for business enterprises: age and size.  Enterprises that are older and larger 
are more able to access the public securities markets.  Older enterprises have a "track record" that 
lenders can examine; larger enterprises will usually want larger loans, which better allow lenders to 
cover their fixed costs of gathering and analyzing the information of the enterprise.  Conversely, 
                                                           
    5 From the perspective of the acquirers of these loans, they are assets; hence the term that is 
frequently used to describe this process is "asset-backed securitization". 
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younger and smaller enterprises will be more likely to have to rely on self-finance and to access 
friends and family.  And in-between enterprises will be able to access specialist lenders. 
 Again, the squiggly lines are meant to indicate that the boundaries are not rigid.  And, again, 
the most important message of the diagram for our purposes is that the arrows indicate that the lines 
are moving toward the origin:  Younger and smaller enterprises that once were the exclusive 
preserve of banks and other specialist lenders can now access the public securities markets; and 
even younger and smaller enterprises that previously could rely only on friends and family can now 
get bank loans, including credit-card loans. 
 We now turn to an extended discussion of some of the manifestations of these changes. 
 
 V. Manifestations 
 The previous sections indicated generally the ways in which the information revolution of 
the new economy has affected the financial sector.  Briefly, information that is better-faster-cheaper 
has allowed lenders/investors within the financial sector to expand their reach.  We now turn to 
some specifics, largely for the U.S. economy. 
 
A. Changes in the structure of banking. 
 With better information, banks and other lenders (including entities that traditionally have 
not been lenders) can extend their lending over a wider geographic range.  "Looking the borrower in 
the eye" may be less important for some kinds of loans, where large amounts of standardized 
financial information pertaining to borrowers and their repayment histories can provide (through the 
process of "credit scoring") a statistically high level of confidence as to the likelihood of repayment. 
 The use of credit scoring has increasingly penetrated bank lending, expanding from residential 
mortgage lending to credit card lending to small business lending.  It is now common for consumers 
to receive credit cards and their associated loans from banks that are located thousands of miles 
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away, and the ultimate investor in a securitized residential mortgage may be located thousands of 
miles away from the home-owner mortgage borrower.  Even banks' loans to small businesses, 
which have traditionally been the most "relationship" and "character" oriented, are being transacted 
over longer distances between banks' offices and the borrowers' locations. 
 One consequence is more competition, as lenders extend their efforts farther into each 
other's geographic and customer-base "turf" and as new lenders enter the field.6  Another is the 
tendency for existing institutions to grow larger (since they can do more things and do them over a 
greater distance) and for there to be fewer of them. 
 This last tendency has been strongly present for banks. (The basic information forces have 
been reinforced by changes in public policy that have permitted greater intra-state and interstate 
branching in the U.S. and have permitted greater international banking operations.)  Table 1 shows 
the trends in the numbers of banks, 1980-2001, as well as their average size.  Table 2 shows the 
percentage of all U.S. bank assets that are accounted for by the 10 largest banks and the percentage 
of assets accounted for by banks that are larger than $10 billion, for 1992-2001.  Both tables tell the 
same story:  U.S. banks are becoming fewer and larger, and the largest banks especially are 
increasing their relative sizes. 
 Table 3 tells a somewhat similar story with regard to international banking in the U.S. from 
1975-2001, whereby non-U.S. banks have generally increased their presence in the U.S.7  Again, 
improved information processing and telecommunications (as well as reduced legal restrictions) 
have surely been influential in permitting this expansion from afar. 
 
                                                           
    6 As is true for other expansions discussed below, changes in public policy -- notably reduced 
legal and regulatory restrictions on such extension efforts -- have also been important. 
    7 The "plateau" and slight decline since the early 1990s has largely been caused by the difficulties 
that have been experienced by Japanese banks generally. 
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B. Securitization. 
 A second facet of financial change and expansion that has been fueled by the information 
revolution has been the securitization of assets that were previously the domain of banks and other 
depositories.  This securitization has proceeded farthest in the area of residential single-family 
home mortgages.  The presences of two "government sponsored enterprises", the Federal National 
Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie 
Mac"), have been important factors in this securitization.  Table 4 shows the dramatic expansion of 
their mortgage securitizations and mortgage holdings for the period 1970-2000, and Table 5 shows 
their substantial shares of various categories of the residential mortgage market. 
 The expanding implementation of credit scoring has played an important role in the 
expansion of asset securitization.  Further, the expansion of securitization has permitted the "slicing 
and dicing" of various attributes of these securities -- for example, the "principal only" (POs) and 
"interest only" (IOs) components of residential mortgage securities -- with a better redistribution of 
these attributes and risks into the hands (portfolios) of individuals and institutions that are better 
situated or have stronger preferences for them. 
 
C. The internationalization of the securities markets. 
 The wider reach of financial transactions has also been manifested in the expansion of 
international securities markets.  Tables 6 and 7 show the rising importance of foreign companies' 
listings on the two major U.S. stock exchanges, the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ, 
over the period 1985-2001.  Table 8 shows the rising volumes of securities purchases and sales 
between U.S. and non-U.S. investors over the period 1980-2000.  And Table 9 shows the rising 
importance of foreigners' holdings of U.S. equity and debt securities and also the rising importance 
of U.S. holdings of the equity and debt securities of other countries. 
 All of these tables (as well as Table 3 on international banking) tell a consistent story:  The 
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information revolution -- vastly improved and lower cost data processing and telecommunications -
- have greatly broadened the geographic reach of finance and facilitated a rising flow of trans-
national financial transactions and involvements.8 
 
D. Expanded finance. 
 One important manifestation of expanded finance has been the wider dissemination and use 
of credit cards (which involve loans from the credit card holder's bank, from the time of purchase 
until the time that the balance is paid off).  In 1970, only about 15% of households had at least one 
credit card; by 1998 over 67% of households had at least one credit card.  Their expanded 
possession also meant expanded use.  In Table 10 that expanded use is documented, for the period 
1970-2001.  As can be seen, the use of credit cards (as indicated by credit card balances 
outstanding, relative to GDP) rose substantially from 1970 through 2001.  By contrast, other forms 
of consumer credit (excluding residential mortgages) declined (relative to GDP) through the early 
1990s and then increased modestly, but in 2001 was still substantially below the level of 1970. 
 
E. Finance and the new economy expansion. 
 Another manifestation of the new economy was the growth and expansion of "high-tech" 
firms in the fields related to information processing and telecommunications; often this was 
associated with the expansion of the use of the Internet and with "Silicon Valley".  Finance played a 
role in these firms' expansion, first through the provision of "seed capital' by venture capital firms 
and then through access to the public securities markets via an "initial public offering" (IPO) of a 
company's stock and subsequent listing on a stock exchange, usually the NASDAQ.  The rise of 
IPO volumes and of the NASDAQ index is documented in Table 11. 
                                                           
    8 As was true for the case of banking, government policies that have reduced the barriers to 
international capital flows have assisted in broadening these boundaries. 
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 With the bursting of the "Internet bubble" in 2000, IPO volumes have declined 
substantially, and the NASDAQ index (as of July 2002) has declined by almost three-quarters from 
its peak, and even the broader-based S&P 500 index has declined by 40% from its peak.  Further, 
the stock market frenzy of the late 1990s clearly induced dubious accounting practices by some 
companies' senior executives (which were approved by their accountants/auditors) and dubious 
recommendations and analysis by some securities firms' personnel, who were swept up in the 
frenzy of benefiting from apparently ever-rising securities prices.  These activities were, of course, 
another example of the kinds of moral hazard behavior. 
 
F. Concerns about too much finance. 
 The expansion of finance, especially consumer finance, has raised two sets of concerns.  
First, the rising levels of consumer debt -- as indicated in the last column of Table 10 -- have raised 
policy worries about widespread hardships if the U.S. economy were to slacken appreciably for a 
sustained period of time.  In this case, many households might find that they had been short-sighted 
in their borrowing:  With their incomes stagnant or reduced, they would find their expanded debt 
burdens to be excessive, leading to widespread personal bankruptcies and repossessions and thus 
generating substantial hardships, especially among lower income households.  This set of events did 
not occur during the recession of the early 1990s and has thus far not occurred during the recession 
of 2001-2002.  Nevertheless, it remains a possibility and a constant policy concern. 
 Second, issues of "predatory" lending -- lending to individuals in amounts and at rates that 
are clearly inappropriate for them -- have arisen concomitantly with expanded finance.  Since less-
well-educated and older individuals sometimes have problems understanding the intricacies of 
finance9 (which create a separate set of asymmetric information problems), this is likely to be a 
                                                           
    9 A policy manifestation of this problem in the securities world is the specific "suitability" and 
"know your customer" obligations on the part of brokers and a more general notion of fiduciary 
obligation on the part of brokers and advisors and other financial facilitators. 
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persistent problem. 
 
G. Concerns about increases in risk and excessive risk-taking. 
 In principle, the financial innovations that have accompanied the information revolution of 
the new economy can allow individuals and institutions better to hedge and reduce risk in their 
portfolios and find more efficient asset combination that better satisfy their risk-versus-return 
preferences.  But the sheer availability of new and sometimes exotic financial instruments may 
instead be a cause of increased risk and risk-taking.  First, unfamiliarity with or ignorance about the 
new instruments may cause investors inadvertently to take on more risk.  Second, investors who are 
inclined to be more aggressive and risk-taking (and who may thereby be taking advantage of the 
asymmetric information disadvantages of others) now have risk-taking instruments more readily 
available to them.  And third, the increased volume of trading in financial instruments may increase 
the general volatility of those instruments' prices. 
 
 VI. A Few Lagging Areas 
 There are a few places in finance where the information revolution of the new economy has 
been slow to take hold.  We will address two prominent ones. 
 First, despite the rising importance of electronic payments, especially for "wholesale" 
transactions among financial institutions but also for retail transactions (of which the credit card 
expansion has already been documented), the paper check remains as the mainstay of retail 
transactions in the United States, much more so than in Europe or Japan.  Despite the attractiveness 
of electronic payments, the volume of paper checks continued to rise through the 1990s.  As of 
2000-2001, the annual volume of checks was estimated at 49.6 billion checks (up from 32 billion in 
1979), accounting for $47.7 trillion in payments (up from $24 trillion).10  The persistence of the 
                                                           
    10 By contrast, electronic payments appear to be only a sixth to a seventh as important, as 
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check seems to be due to a combination of factors:  First, users find the proof-of-transaction and 
record-keeping aspects of checks worthwhile.  Second, the magnetic ink coding system for checks 
(found at the bottom of each check) has facilitated their system-wide automated reading and 
sorting.  Third, the still-over-8,000 banks have had difficulties in agreeing on common systems and 
standards to facilitate electronic substitutions for checks.11  And fourth, banks have tended to 
underprice check-based transactions to their customers. 
 Second (and related to the first), banks have been slow to embrace the Internet as a vehicle 
for transactions.  As of mid-year 2000 fewer than two dozen pure Internet banks had been 
established, and even start-up banks (of which there were an average of 138 per year during the 
period 1990-2001) rarely chose a purely Internet presence as part of their business model.  Further, 
even established "bricks-and-mortar" banks have been slow to create transactional websites; as of 
year-end 1999 only about an eighth of all commercial banks had transactional websites, although 
most large banks had them.  But the numbers of bricks-and-mortar branches of banks have 
continued to increase, despite the rising importance of electronic transactions, as is indicated in the 
last column of Table 1.   Apparently, there are still important aspects of transactions that call for 
face-to-face contacts. 
 All of this is in contrast to the securities area, where Internet-based trading was warmly 
embraced by start-ups and also by some established firms and where Internet-based trading 
accounted for a quarter-to-a-third of all transactions in some stocks at the height of the trading 
boom of the late 1990s. 
 Again, there are a number of reasons for banks' delays.  First, banks have been "burned" in 
the past by failed electronic transactions systems.  Second, many bank customers (those who are 
                                                                                                                                                             
measured by financial value of the transactions. 
    11 This is in turn is due to the "network" aspects of banks' interconnectedness with each other. 
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older and have lower levels of education) have little interest in Internet-based transactions.  (Even 
individuals' usage of automatic teller machines (ATMs) tends to be strongly and positively related 
to education levels and negatively related to age.)  Personal contact with bank tellers and other bank 
personnel remain important.  Third, agreement on common systems among the thousands of banks 
has been difficult.12 
 
 VII. Conclusion 
 The new economy has had a substantial effect on banks and other financial institutions.  
This is because financial firms rely heavily on information for their basic decisions and the new 
economy has been all about making information processing and dissemination faster-better-
cheaper.  There are some lagging aspects of the sector, especially in banking, but a common theme 
is the difficulty of establishing common systems and standards among an interconnected network of 
over 8,000 banks.  And, despite the faster-better-cheaper aspects of information processing and 
dissemination, some problems of asymmetric information persist and may even worsen. 
 As the information revolution of the new economy continues to unfold, the financial sector 
will surely continue to be heavily affected. 
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Figure 1: The Spectrum of Informational Transparency/Opaqueneness
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Figure 2: Two Determinants of Opaqueness/Transparency
AGE
securities markets
banks and other
financial intermediaries,
trade credit
personal finance,
friends, family
0 SIZE
  
 
18
Table 1: Numbers and Average Sizes of Commercial Banks, 1980-2001 
 
 
 
Year 
Number of 
Commercial Banks 
(year end) 
Average Size of 
Bank 
($ million) 
Number of offices 
(branches plus 
home offices) 
1980 14,435 $128.6 53,171 
1985 14,243   191.9 57,764 
1990 12,338   274.7 63,160 
1991 11,920   287.8 64,006 
1992 11,461   305.9 63,903 
1993 10,957   338.2 64,078 
1994 10,450   383.8 65,594 
1995   9,941   433.8 66,454 
1996   9,528   480.5 67,316 
1997   9,143   548.5 69,463 
1998   8,774   620.1 70,731 
1999   8,580   668.4 71,939 
2000   8,315   750.3 72,394 
2001   8,080   813.0 73,644 
Source: FDIC 
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Table 2: Percentage of All Bank Assets Accounted for by the Largest Ten Banks and by 
All Banks with Assets Greater than $10 Billion, 1992-2001 
 
 
Year 
Share of Ten 
Largest Banks 
Banks with Assets Greater than $10 Billion 
  Number Share 
1992    22.5% 51    41.2% 
1993            22.9 55 44.0 
1994 24.6 64 48.4 
1995 25.3 75 52.5 
1996 22.2 73 56.4 
1997 32.0 66 62.2 
1998 35.4 71 65.1 
1999 35.6 76 66.7 
2000 37.8 82 69.7 
2001 39.9 80 70.2 
Source: FDIC, Federal Reserve 
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Table 3: Foreign Banks’ U.S. Assets, as a Percentage of Total U.S. Bank Assets, 1975-
2001 
 
 
Year 
Foreign Bank Assets, as a Percentage of 
Total U.S. Bank Assets 
1975     5.3% 
1980 11.9 
1985 16.1 
1990 21.4 
1991 22.6 
1992 22.2 
1993 21.2 
1994 22.0 
1995 21.7 
1996 20.1 
1997 20.6 
1998 19.2 
1999 19.0 
2000 19.9 
2001 20.2 
Source: Federal Reserve 
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Table 4: Balance Sheet and Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) Data, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 1980-2000 
 (in billions of dollars) 
 
   Fannie Mae    |   Freddie Mac 
        | 
   Retained    |   Retained 
 Total  mortgage     MBSs  | Total  mortgage     MBSs 
Year assets  portfolioa outstandingb  | assets  portfolioa outstandingb 
 
1980  $57.9     $55.6       $0.0       $5.5      $5.0     $17.0 
 
1985    99.1    94.1       54.6       16.6      13.5       99.9 
 
1990  133.1     114.1     88.1       40.6      21.5     316.4 
 
1995  316.6     252.9     513.2     137.2       107.7     459.0 
 
2000  675.1     607.6     706.7     459.3       385.5     576.1 
 
a Includes repurchased MBSs. 
b Excludes MBSs that are held in portfolio. 
 
Source: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
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Table 5: The Combined Shares of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as a Percentage of 
Housing Finance, 2000 
 
 
Category 
Combined Share of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac 
All residential mortgages    39% 
All single-family (one-four units) 
mortgages (excludes multi-family) 
 
40 
All single-family “conventional” mortgages 
(excludes government-insured mortgages) 
 
 
48 
All single-family “conforming” mortgages 
(excludes “jumbo” mortgages, larger than 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can finance) 
 
 
60 
All fixed-rate single-family conforming 
mortgages (excludes adjustable-rate 
mortgages) 
 
 
71 
Source: Congressional Budget Office 
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Table 6: Non-U.S. Companies Listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 1985-
2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
Number of 
listed non-
U.S. 
companies 
 
 
Listed 
non-U.S. 
companies 
as a % of 
all listed 
companies
Annual 
value of 
shares 
traded of 
listed non-
U.S. 
companies 
($B) 
Listed 
non-U.S. 
companies 
as a % of 
trading 
value of 
all listed 
companies
 
 
Market 
value of 
listed non-
U.S. 
companies 
($B) 
Listed 
non-U.S. 
companies 
as a % of 
market 
value of 
all listed 
companies
1985   54       3.5%      n.a.    n.a. $68    3.5% 
1990   96   5.4      n.a.    n.a. 128 4.5 
1991 105   5.6    $89       5.9% 165 4.4 
1992 120   5.7    117   6.7 157 3.9 
1993 153   6.5    184   8.0 226 5.0 
1994 204   7.9    238   9.7 208 4.7 
1995 234   8.7    262   8.5 257 4.3 
1996 291 10.0    335   8.2 353 4.8 
1997 343 11.3    485   8.4 424 4.5 
1998 379 12.2    564   7.7 468 4.3 
1999 394 13.0    687   7.7 758 6.2 
2000 420 14.5 1,141 10.3 739 6.0 
2001 448 16.0    789   7.5 587 5.3 
 
Source: NYSE 
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Table 7: Non-U.S. Issues Listed on the NASDAQ, 1985-2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
Number of 
listed non-U.S. 
issues 
 
 
Listed non-U.S. 
issues as a % of 
all listed issues 
Annual value of 
shares traded of 
all listed non-
U.S. traded 
companies ($B) 
Listed non-U.S. 
companies as a 
% of trading 
value of all 
listed 
companies 
1985 282      5.9% $13    5.6% 
1990 271   5.8     9 2.0 
1991 268   5.7   27 3.9 
1992 275   5.8   30 3.4 
1993 322   6.0   73 5.4 
1994 350   6.1   81 5.6 
1995 395   6.6 100 4.2 
1996 460   7.2 125 3.8 
1997 499   8.0 186 4.1 
1998 484   8.7 206 3.4 
1999 462   8.9 385 3.5 
2000 509 10.1 754 3.7 
2001 422   9.7 442 4.0 
 
Source: NASDAQ 
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Table 8: Cross-Border Transactions in Securities between U.S. and Non-U.S. Investors, 
1980-2000 
 
Gross sales and purchases of securities between residents and non-residents of the U.S. 
(as a percentage of U.S. GDP) 
 
1980         9.0% 
1985   34.8 
1990   88.1 
1991   94.5 
1992 105.3 
1993 127.1 
1994 128.8 
1995 132.6 
1996 156.2 
1997 207.6 
1998 222.2 
1999 200.2 
2000 227.8 
 
Source: U.S. Treasury 
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Table 9: Foreign Holdings of U.S. Equity and Debt Securities, and U.S. Holdings of Foreign 
Equity and Debt Securities, 1945-2000 
 
Foreign holdings of U.S. securities U.S. holdings of foreign securities 
Equity Debt Equity Debt 
 
 
 
 
Amount 
(US$B) 
 
As a % of 
all U.S. 
equity 
securities 
 
 
 
 
Amount 
(U$B) 
 
 
As a % of 
all U.S. 
debt 
securities 
 
 
 
 
Amount 
(US$B) 
As a % 
of all 
U.S. 
holdings 
of equity 
securities 
 
 
 
 
Amount 
(US$B) 
As a % 
of all 
U.S. 
holdings 
of debt 
securities 
1945      $3      2.5%      $3      1.1%      $1     0.9%    $3    1.1% 
1950        3   2.1        4   1.4        1  0.7     3 1.0 
1955        7   2.5        6   1.7        2  0.7     3 0.9 
1960        9   2.1      13   3.2        4  1.0     6 1.5 
1965      15   2.0      17   3.3        5  0.7     9 1.8 
1970      27   3.2      30   4.1        7  0.9   14 2.0 
1975      33   3.9      80   6.8      10  1.2   27 2.4 
1980      75   5.0    182   8.8      19  1.3   56 2.9 
1985    137   6.0    375   8.7       44  2.0 106 2.6 
1990    244   6.9    716   9.7    198  5.7 190 2.8 
1991    299   6.1    779   9.7    279  5.8 212 2.8 
1992    329   6.1    860   9.8    314  5.8 225 2.8 
1993    374   5.9    994 10.4    544  8.4 299 3.4 
1994    398   6.3 1,094 10.8    628  9.6 285 3.1 
1995    528   6.2 1,409 13.0    777  8.9 355 3.6 
1996    657   6.4 1,801 15.4 1,003  9.4 434 4.2 
1997    920   6.9 2,114 16.8 1,208  8.9 493 4.5 
1998 1,175   7.5 2,397 17.3 1,476  9.3 536 4.5 
1999 1,538   7.9 2,557 16.9 2,027 10.1 568 4.3 
2000 1,748 10.0 2,887 18.1 1,787 10.2 626 4.6 
Source: Federal Reserve 
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Table 10: Outstanding Consumer Credit, as a Percentage of U.S. GDP, 1970-2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
End-of-Year Credit 
Card Balances, as a 
Percentage of GDP 
 
 
Other Consumer 
Credita Outstanding at 
Year-End, as a 
Percentage of GDP 
Sum of Credit Card 
Balances and Other 
Consumer Credit 
Outstanding at 
Year-End, as a 
Percentage of GDP 
1970    0.5%    12.3%    12.8% 
1975 0.9 11.7 12.6 
1980 2.1 10.6 12.7 
1985 2.9 11.2 14.1 
1990 4.3   9.6 13.7 
1991 4.6   8.6 13.2 
1992 4.6   8.0 12.6 
1993 4.9   8.0 12.9 
1994 5.4   8.5 13.9 
1995 6.3   8.9 15.2 
1996 6.7   8.9 15.6 
1997 6.7   8.6 15.3 
1998 6.7   8.7 15.4 
1999 6.7   8.9 15.6 
2000 7.0   9.1 16.1 
2001 7.1   9.5 16.6 
a Excludes residential mortgages 
Source: Federal Reserve 
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Table 11: Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and the NASDAQ Index, 1980-2001 
 
 
Year 
 
Number of IPOs 
Capital Raised by 
IPOs ($ billion) 
NASDAQ Index 
(year end) 
1980   70 $18.7    202.3 
1985 179   29.0    324.9 
1990 104   19.4    373.8 
1991 273   48.2    586.3 
1992 385   57.1    677.0 
1993 483   82.7    776.8 
1994 387   47.6    752.0 
1995 432   56.3 1,052.1 
1996 621   82.4 1,291.0 
1997 432   81.4 1,570.4 
1998 267   82.9 2,192.7 
1999 457 105.7 4,069.3 
2000 346 129.7 2,470.5 
2001   80 n.a. 1,577.0 
Sources: Federal Reserve; Thomson Financial Securities Data Corp.; NASDAQ 
 
